Tuesday, September 28, 2010

Civil Code: Article 37-41 Digested Cases

CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and JACOBA CABILIN, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. 26795
July 31, 1970

          This is an appeal on points of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte (Judge Onofre Sison Abalos, presiding), dismissing a complaint for support and damages, and another order denying amendment of the same pleading.

          Icao, a married man, succeeded in having sex with Quimiguing, a student, several times by force and intimidation and without her consent. As a result, she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by Icao, and had to stop studying. Quimiguing claims support at P120.00 monthly, damages and attorney’s fees. Icao moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action since complainant did not allege that the child had indeed been born; trial judge sustained defendant’s motion. Plaintiff amended the complaint but trial court sustained the dismissal and ruled that no amendment to complaint is allowable. Hence, this appeal.

         Whether or not the case is covered by Article 40 of the New Civil Code which will entitle the child to claim support through the mother.

         Plaintiff, through an amended complaint, avers that as a result of the intercourse, she had later given birth to a baby girl. The Supreme Court says that since, as provided in Article 40 of the New Civil Code (the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes favorable to it, provided, it be born later with the conditions specified in following article), petitioner Quimiguing’s child, since time of conception, and as having fulfilled the requirement of having been born later, has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly of the defendant-appellee.
         Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she was carrying, plaintiff herself had a cause of action for damages under the terms of the complaint; and the order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action was doubly in error.
        WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.

ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents
2 SCRA 801
July 20, 1961

            Oscar Lazo, now husband of Nita Villanueva, impregnated her before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from the parent, she had herself aborted by petitioner Antonio Geluz. After her marriage, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the COMELEC and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself an abortion again by Geluz. Less than two years later, Nita incurred a third abortion of a two-month old fetus, in consideration of the sum of P50.00. Her husband knew not, nor consented to the abortion. Private respondent sued petitioner for damages based on the third and last abortion. The trial court rendered judgment ordering Antonio Geluz to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 as attorney’s fee and the cost of the suit. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

           Whether the husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages  from physician who caused the same to their unborn child.

             No. It is no answer to invoke the presumptive personality of a conceived child under Article 40 of the Civil Code because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive. In the present case, the child was dead when separated from its mother’s womb. This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to damages. However, such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from injury or violation of the rights of the deceased child. Even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical personality.
            The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed. Without costs.

ANTONIA L. DE JESUS, ET AL., plaintiff-appellant, vs. CESAR SYQUIA, defendant-appellant
58 Phil. 866
November 28, 1933

               This is an appeal by plaintiff and defendant regarding the trial court's decision of denying part of the relief sought by plaintiffs, where Antonia compels Cesar to recognize Ismael and Pacita, and of requiring defendant to recognize Ismael Loanco and to pay for his maintenance.
               Cesar Syquia, twenty-three years old, and an unmarried scion of the prominent family in Manila, courted Antonia de Jesus who was 20 years old. Amorous relations between them resulted in de Jesus giving birth to a baby boy on June 17, 1931. They lived together for one year until Antonia got pregnant again. Cesar left to marry another woman, but he recognized his paternity of the first child in writing with a letter to the priest and uninterrupted possession of natural child status for one year. Regarding Pacita, no recognition mentioned.

            Whether the trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself, and that as a consequence, the defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco, under No. 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code.

                The trial court was right in refusing to give damages to de Jesus for supposed breach of contract. Such promise is not satisfactorily proved, and we may add that the action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. This case exhibits none of the features necessary to maintain such an action. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco.
                 The judgment appealed from is in all respects affirmed, without costs. So ordered.

No comments:

Post a Comment